CHOICE OF LAW AND THE PROPOSED
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE:
NEW PERSPECTIVES*
LOUISE WEINBERGt

I.

INTRODUCTION:

THE PROBLEM BEFORE CONGRESS

On November 20, 1972, the Supreme Court promulgated a
new federal evidentiary code,' to become effective July 1, 1973,
unless Congress took supervening action.2 It was then for Congress to determine, if only by inaction, whether the proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence would control trials of cases in federal
courts. It was widely anticipated that Congress would, as a matter
of course, allow the proposed rules to take effcct.3 However,
despite the submission to the profession of substantially similar
preliminary drafts in 19691 and in 1971, 5 the proposed rules
have recently become the focus of criticism. The controversy
centers for the most part upon two issues: first, whether procedural evidentiary rules have been used to effect substantive
changes in the law; and second, whether the new rules override
conflicting state rules thought to be substantive in nature in cases
in which state law supplies the rule of decision.6 In response to
this controversy Congress has passed a bill postponing the rules'
* The author wishes to ex ress appreciation for many valuable insights to Professor
Donald T. Trautman of the farvard Law School.
t Teaching Fellow, Harvard Law School. A.B. 1954, Cornell University; J.D. 1969,
Harvard University. Member, Massachusetts Bar.
I Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972)
(hereinafter cited as Proposed Fed. R. Evid.]. The historical background of the proposed
rules has been fully detailed elsewhere. A good account may be found in Spangenberg,
The FederalRules of Evidence-An Attempt at Uniformity in Federal Courts, 15 WAYNE L. REv.
1061 (1969) (Mr. Spangenberg is a member of the Advisory Committee on Rules of
Evidence, judicial Conference of the United States). Background also appears in Hearings
on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of FederalCriminal Laws
of the House Comm. on the Judiavy, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 2, at 11(1973) (testimony of
Judge Albert B. Marns, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States; Albert E. Jenner, Tr., Chairman, Advisory
Committee on Rules of Evidence,JTudicial Conference of the United States; Professor
Edward W. Cleary, Reporter, Advsow Committee on Rules of Evidence, Judicial
Conference of the United States) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
2
See 1S U.S.C. § 3771 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
3 See, e.g., MacKenzie, New Rules of Evidence, U.S. Courts Facing Changes, Washington
Post, Nov. 24, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
4 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969).
5 Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates,
51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
6
Weaver, Court Rule Shift Opposed in House, Panel Votes Indefinite Delay in Evidence
Changes, N.Y. Times, March 7, 1973, at 25, col. 1.
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effective date until such time as Congress should affirmatively
approve them;7 and on March 30, 1973, this legislation was
signed into law by President Nixon.A
This Article does not directly deal with either of the issues
just mentioned. Rather, it focuses on functional choice-of-law
considerations bearing upon promulgation of federal evidentiary
rules. These considerations are peculiarly for the Congress to
weigh in examining the proposed rules, because they concern
the wisdom of promulgating the proposed rules as a unit and
cannot be expected to arise by way of litigation on a case-by-case
basis, as challenges to the validity of particular rules might arise.
Section II, following, argues that although there is no constitutional impediment to promulgation of federal evidentiary
rules within the reach of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,9 there are
important desiderata beyond the scope of Erie which have their
source in fundamental understandings of the appropriate uses
of federal law in our federal system and which may, in the
absence of clearly countervailing national needs, require the
application of state law even to procedural issues. Section III
explores arguments generally advanced in favor of uniform
federal evidentiary rules in federal courts. This leads to conclusions, first that although there is a genuine need to unify the
reception of evidence in federal courts under all heads of federal
jurisdiction, it is not necessary that a comprehensive code of
federal evidentiary law be created to deal with the problem; and
second that arguments favoring adoption of the proposed rules
based on the national interest in evidentiary reform must fail by
virtue of the failure of the proposed rules to effect reform. In
this latter respect the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
distinguished from the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.
Section IV examines functional considerations favoring federal
conformity to state law in procedural matters generally and in
evidentiary matters particularly. In Section V, segments of the
proposed rules are critically scrutinized in light of considerations
raised in Section IV, and it is argued that new federal evidentiary law on the scale proposed would create substantial
7 The proposed rules were sent to the Subcommittee on Criminal justice (then the
Special Committee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws) of the House Judiciary
Committee for hearings in February and March of 1973. In Tune of 1973, the subcommittee published a proposed bill which would establish the rules with numerous amendments. H.R. 5463, 93cCong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 42 U.S.L.W. 1 (1973). The bill was
reported out of the subcommittee with amendments on November 15, 1973. H.R. REP.
No. 650, 93d Cone., 1st Sess. (1973). The bill passed the House Feb. 6. 1974. 120 CONG.
REc. 8 H570 (1974f-and is presently before tie Senate.
Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
9 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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difficulties for lawyers in both state and federal courts. Section
VI then proposes a federal legislative choice-of-law rule as a
superior technique for dealing with existing evidentiary problems in federal courts.
II.

TOWARD A

MORE

MEANINGFUL ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL

CHOICE-OF-LAW QUESTIONS FOR FEDERAL COURTS

Customary analysis of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence has proceeded in two stages. First, after reassuring themselves that the proposed rules were within the Supreme Court's
power to promulgate under the enabling legislation,' 0 the Advisory Committee" and the commentators' 2 have inquired into the
proposed rules' constitutionality under the principles of Erie.
The Erie analysis focuses upon the validity of particular rules 13
rather than the rules as a whole, because evidentiary rules are
generally characterized as procedural.' 4 Only the more "substantive" in content of the proposed rules are thought to present any
real constitutional difficulty, and then only in cases as to which
state iaw supplies the rule of decision (chiefly diversity cases).
Thus, the draftsmen of the proposed rules, sensitive to Eie, have
mandated reference to state law for rules governing certain
presumptions in trials of civil cases where state law supplies the
rule of decision.' 5 Similarly, an exclusive code of federal
privileges has been created,' 6 but only after consideration of the
17
constitutional question.
1018 U.S.C. § 3771 (1970) (criminal); 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970); id. § 2075 (bankruptcy). See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the judicial Conference of
the United States, A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing
Uniform Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73, 100-05 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as 1962 Preliminary Report]; authorities cited in Weinstein, The
Un!formity-Conformity Dilemma FacingDraftsmen of FederalRules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L.
R v. 353, 355 n.12 (1969). Significantly, however, H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1973), concludes that the Supreme Court lacked power under the enabling acts to
promulgate the proposed rules.
"See 1962 Preliminary Report, supra note 10, at 105-08.
i2See Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REv. 275, 287-301
(1962); Green, Hghlights of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 4 GA. L. REv. 1, 14
(1969); Ladd, Uniform Evidence Rules in the Federal Courts, 49 VA. L. REv. 292 (1963);
Weinstein, supra note 10, at 356-57. See also Wright, ProceduralReform: Its Limitations and
Its Future, 1 GA. L. REv. 563, 571-72 (1967).
13See e.g., Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 302, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 211; id.
Rule 901, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 230.
See 1962 PreliminaryReport, supra note 10, at 108: "The generally accepted view...
is that most evidence rules are merely procedural and not within the Erie doctrine."
(footnote
omitted). See also authorities cited note 12 supra.
1
5 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 302, 56 F.R.D. 211.
16
1d. Rules 501-12, 56 F.R.D. 230-59.
17 See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 501, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 230-34. The
House bill would appl state privileges in civil cases for which state law supplies the rule
of decision, H.R. 546, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. rule 302, reprinted in 42 U.S.L.W. 5 (1973),
and would eliminate the code of federal privileges. However, the bill would permit
federal courts to work out a federal common law of privileges in federal law cases. H.R.
5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. rule 501, reprinted in 42U.S.L.W. 6 (1973).
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The narrow constitutional question under Erie is further
narrowed, perhaps beyond the point of usefulness, by the decision in Hanna v. Plumer.18 Hanna is widely understood-and
understood by the rules' draftsmen' 9 -to mean that Congress
and its rulemaking delegate have legislative competence, with
respect to any question rationally classifiable as "procedural," to
make rules for federal courts which will override a directly
conflicting state rule even in state law cases. The appropriateness
of the exercise of that power, however, is a question that does
not arise under Erie and Hanna.
Given the sweeping applicability of an arguably procedural
rule after Hanna, a second consideration has drawn increased
attention in the commentators' analyses.2 0 As expressed by the
American Bar Association Special Committee on Federal Rules
of Procedure,
Rulemakers must ... weigh, in much the same way as
Congress might, the desirability of uniformity and
efficiency in federal litigation against the desirability of
permitting the states, wherever possible, to exercise
power and enforce their own policy in areas normally
regulated by the states.2 '
The concern expressed by these commentators is not radically
different from that underlying Erie: to avoid displacement of
substantive state law by federal rules in situations where arguably
"substantive" state interests should control. Thus, "writers have
suggested that, even if the Supreme Court can legally issue
Federal Rules of Evidence which conflict with state policy in
areas which are properly the concern of the states, it should not
do so.1' 22 Like the Erie issue, this policy problem focuses on
individual rules and their applications.
But of course there has always existed a prior question,
which in the early stages was appropriately for the Advisory
Committee and now, clearly, is for Congress: 23 whether
"8380 U.S. 460 (1965).
9 See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 501, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 32-33, citing
Wright, supra note 12, at 572-73. "Regardless of what once might have been thought to
be the command of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins... Hanna v. Plumer... is believed to locate
the problem in the area of choice ....
E
" See Cleary, The Planfor the Adoption of Rules o Evidence for United States Districo
Courts, 25 REc. AsS'N BAR OF Crry OF N.Y. 142, 145 (1970); Green, supra note 12, at 6-17;
Weinstein, supra note 10, at 357-61; Wright, supra note 12, at 572-74.
21 38 F.R.D. 95, 103 (1965). The Committee was considering amendments to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in its report, but the principle is appropriately applied to
evidence rules as well. See Green, supra note 12, at 7; Weinstein, supra note 10, at 357-58.
22 Green, supra note 12, at 6 (footnote omitted) (citing Degnan, supra note 12;
Weinstein, supra note 10; Wright, supra note 12).
23 Unlike Erie questions, this basic issue cannot be expected to arise by way of
litigation.
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-assuming Congress has the power-to promulgate a code of
new federal rules at all. The answer to this question cannot, of
course, be furnished by Erie or Hanna or by separate examination of the policies affected by particular rules. It requires a
weighing of broader functional considerations in light of the
needs of our dual court system, and with sensitivity to the nature
and uses of federal law in that system.
This prior question was ignored by the Advisory Committee,
however,2 4 and has received only cursory treatment in the
literature,2 5 a result no doubt partly attributable' to the fact that
its answer seems to have been presumed all along. 2 6 A virtual
presumption in favor of federal law for federal procedure has
pervaded the discussion with a surface reasonableness that has
made further analysis appear unnecessary or even reactionary.
We find ourselves at the crest of the historic wave of enthusiastic
reform of federal procedure that for generations has swept all
objections before it, and is made almost irresistible by the success
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 7 Yet it is at least
possible to distinguish evidentiary rules from procedural rules
generally, as Section IV, below, attempts to do, and quite possible to distinguish the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence from
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as is attempted in Section
III. Moreover, our thinking about the role of federal law in our
federal system has undergone great changes since the inception
of the movement that led to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A fresh look at the propriety of federal law for this area
might be helpful.2"
2

4 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 246 (testimony of Judge Henry Friendly):
With the benefit of hindsight, the error seems to me to have lain in the too ready
acceptance, without opportunity for any full debate of the preliminary report
many years ago that Federal Rules of Evidence should be drafted. It was natural
that there was not much debate. After all, the proposal was simply that a
committee be appointed to attempt to draft rules. . . . Once the Advisory
Committee on Rules of Evidence ... went to work, the project acquired its own
momentum. The questions that were put to the profession when the drafted
rules were circulated were not whether there should be such rules-an issue that
apparently
was regarded as having been settled-but what the rules should be.
2
SSee Callahan & erguson, Evidence and the New FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 45
YALE G.J. 622, 644-47 (1936); Weinstein, supra note 10, at 358-61. Weinstein, who has
ven the issue its fullest consideration, states without citation to example or authority
tat "Almost every commentator who has considered the matter favors adoption of a
comprehensive set of federal rules of evidence." Id. 355. After a brief discussion, he
concludes that the only real problems revolve around particular rules of substantive
impact.
26 Id. 361.
See note 24 supra.
27 See Section III infra.
28 A related reason for the generally prevailing assumption that the proposed federal
evidence code would be an appropriate exercise of national lawmaking power may have
been a tendency to rely upon the notion, long a maxim of conflicts law, that procedure is
for the forum. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 122 (1971) [hereinaf-
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This is not to argue that it would be merely desir-

able or convenient to consider the advantages and disadvantages
of the proposed new rules. Rather, such scrutiny is virtually
required by a principle of serious institutional dignity, the prin-

ciple of restraint in the exercise of national lawmaking power.
This principle requires as a precondition of the exercise of
national lawmaking power a clear showing of national need.29 In
addition this principle requires that even where a national need
has been clearly shown, national lawmaking power must be
exercised in the manner least intrusive upon local needs. Thus,
as has been observed by weighty authority, federal law in our

system has traditionally been and continues to be interstitial. 30
The mass of power to regulate the ordinary affairs of citizens is
allocated to the states; and federal law, statutory or decisional,
arises to meet national needs only as those needs arise.
This restraint in the exercise of federal lawmaking power
rests on important national policies. These include the interest in
economy of federal lawmaking effort.3 ' But they also encompass
more important interests, the interest in the smooth functioning
of the federal system, which in turn depends on avoiding interference with state policy concerns and disruption of settled local
arrangements and expectations. These are national rather than
state policy concerns. Finally, the principle of restraint in the
exercise of federal lawmaking power rests on the national interest in avoiding, where possible, duplicate sets of laws governing similar conduct, with the attendant risks of undue
complexity 32 and of unseemly, disturbing or unfair disparities.
ter cited as RESTATEMENT]. But it should be pointed out that this maxim does not apply
where a federal-state (vertical) choice-of-law problem is presented. See id. Introductory
Note to Ch. 6 (procedural chapter inapplicable to vertical conflicts of laws). Unlike the
courts of any state, a federal trial court is located within a separate jurisdictional entity
already employing local procedures. While it would be unreasonable ever to impose upon
one state's courts the burden of applying another state's merely procedural laws, all trial
lawyers and many trial judges in the federal courts, being members of the bar of the state
in which the federal district court sits, are already fully familiar with the procedural rules
of the courts of that state. In this light, then, it is dear that the maxim properly signifies
that procedure is for the forum state.
R See, e.g., United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966)
(timeliness of suits for breach of contract under § 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act determined by state law, in view of federal statutor silence on the issue,
where no predominant federal interest in uniformity was established); Degnan, supra
note 12, at 301: "the federal government should not undertake to correct state errors
except when protecting a vital federal interest." See generally Comment, The Federal
Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1512 (1969) (arguing for a presumption in favor of state
law).
30 H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 435

(1953).

3, See, e.g., Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941) (state rate
applied in determining interest on federal judgment).
11 See generally A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS
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These latter concerns, of course, underlie the mandate of Erie, in
the sense that disregard of them may produce federal law so
33
clearly inappropriate as to be unconstitutional.
Thus, only a preliminary showing of national need can
justify an exercise of national lawmaking power, and then only
upon a preliminary determination that such need is sufficient to
override these preexisting national policies. Finally, even where
an overriding need has been shown, national policy requires that
federal lawmaking power be exercised only with restraint, that is,
in the least intrusive way capable of satisfying the national need.
The inquiry into the nature of the national need, its weight and
the least intrusive ways of satisfying it will compel scrutiny of the
functional advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives.
While the question whether to have a federal evidentiary
code now arises in the legislative context, the principle of restraint in the exercise of national lawmaking power has been
most systematically articulated in the context of judicial decisions. In fleshing out a federal statutory framework, the courts
have considered whether to interpolate federal law where the
statutes are silent or whether to apply established state law. The
Supreme Court has frequently 34 held that where there is no
demonstrable national need to the contrary, existing state law,
rather than new federal law, was to be used. 35 For example, the
Court has adopted state rules to supplement substantive federal
law in cases arising under federal law, whether within 36 or
without 37 the diversity jurisdiction. With respect to procedure, in
1049-59 (1965) [hereinafter cited as VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN]; examples cited notes
35-44 infra.
33See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-78 (1938); cf Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 34460, 474-75 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
But cf., e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (federal
common law to supply substantive law in actions under § 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act).
'5 Federal law tends to rely for the very meaning of words and concepts on state law
understandings. "For example, federal tax legislation uses such terms as 'sale,' 'wife,'
'husband,' and 'gift.' These concepts are often not regulated by any federal rules,
legislative or judicial; instead, state law is drawn on to supplement the federal rule and
thus provide a fully dispositive rule." VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 32, at 1050.
See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (state law governs who is a "child" for
purposes of copyright renewal). But see Weber v. Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972) (recognition of national constitutional limit on state power to discriminate against
illegitimate children). See generally D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447, 465
(1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
"6See, e.g., Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29
(1956) (state law held to govern burden of proof in diversity case on issue of good faith
of taker of government bonds, no federal need for special rule, but federal law
governs issue of whether bonds are overdue).
37 See, e.g., Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964) (survival provisions of government bonds modified by state community property laws, to avoid unfair change in settled
property law); United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960) (federal tax liens extin-
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cases within the diversity jurisdiction the Court has applied state
law to numerous issues rationally capable of classification as
"procedural. ' '38 Arguably, Hanna v. Plumer may be read for the
proposition that state law is presumed to control federal procedure in state law cases absent clearly conflicting federal
authority. 3 9 Indeed, state law has been held to govern certain
"procedural" points even in federal question cases,4 ° where no
need for an independent uniform national rule can be made
out. 4 ' These decisions would seem to demonstrate a presumption in favor of state procedural law for trials under all headings
of federal jurisdiction, and not a presumption in favor of federal
procedural law.
That Congress has characteristically restrained its legislative
power, absent the showing of a clear national need, may be fairly
argued. But the point may be more simply made by noting the
frequent congressional use of mandatory reference to state law
to furnish the content of federal laws. 42 The example most
clearly related to this discussion, of course, is the long history of
congressionally required conformity of federal court procedures
to state procedural law. 4 3 This pattern of conformity was not
guished by prior state foreclosure proceedings to'which the United States was not a party,
to avoid intrusion upon expectations under settled property law); De Sylva v. Ballentine,
351 U.S. 570 (1956) (state law governs who is a "child" for purposes of copyright
renewal); Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946) (state law
controls whether machinery is real or personal property for tax purposes under Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, to avoid raising undue disparities in absence of need
for uniform rule; state law here apparently used to give content to federal law); R.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 465 n.1 (1971).
' 8 See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (statute of limitations);
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1953) (irrevocable arbitration
clause); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (security for
expenses in stockholder derivative action).
19See 380 U.S. at 470, 472. Some lower courts continue to apply state law on a
pre-Hanna approach despite apparent applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the issue is arguably procedural. Comment, Uneasiness In The Lower Federal
Courts Over Federal Rules Supremacy, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 207, 223-27 (1969).
4 See, e.g., United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966)
(period of limitations for actions under § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act);
Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941) (interest rate applied on
federal judgment).
41 Where there is such a national need, it may govern at the trial of federal questions
even in state courts. E.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952)
(state court required to permit trial by jury of fraud issue concerning validity of release in
F.E.L.A. case).
42 See, e.g., Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 607 (1970); Assimilative Claims Act, 18 id. § 13; Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 id. § 2674; FED. R. Civ. P.
4(e), 17(b), 62(0, 64, 69(a); cf. cases cited notes 35, 37, 40 supra.
3Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93; Act of Ma 8, 1792, ch. 36, 1 Stat.
275; Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, 4 Stat. 278; Act of Aug. 1, 1842, ch. 109, 5 Stat. 499;
Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5, 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (§ 5 prescribing "that the practice,
pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in other than equity and admiralty causes
in the circuit and district courts ... shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice...
existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State within which such
circuit or district courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding .. "
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altered until the promulgation in 1938 of separate federal rules
of civil procedure which constituted a very significant improvement over the confused system of conformity then existing 44 and
furthered a national interest in procedural reform in all courts
by serving as a model for the states.
In light of the important limitations upon the use of federal
law apart from Erie, then, it is clear that the questions for
Congress cannot be limited to the remote issue whether there is
national lawmaking power or to the question whether particular
rules will have a substantive impact on state policies.4 5 Rather,
the questions for Congress are: What, as a functional matter, are
the present problems associated with the reception of evidence in
federal courts? What other national needs in this area can be
identified? Would the promulgation of uniform national evidentiary rules for federal courts satisfy such national problems and
needs? Specifically, would the promulgation of the proposed
rules do so? Would the proposed rules intrude in an undesirable
way upon the preexisting background of state evidentiary law? If
so, are there less intrusive alternatives than the promulgation of
the proposed rules or of any uniform national evidentiary rules,
alternatives which could solve genuine evidentiary problems currently obtaining in federal courts?
III.

ADVANTAGES OF UNIFORM

FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE:

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE DISTINGUISHED

A.

Uniformity Throughout Federal Courts

Of the commentators who argue the need for uniformity in
federal evidentiary rules throughout the federal court system,
Judge Weinstein has stated the position most cogently:
[L]ooked at from the vantage point of Washington, the
pressure towards uniform rules of evidence in the federal courts is great. It would make it easier to move
4 Prior to 1872 the conformity mandated by statute was a static conformity-to state
procedures existing at the time of the enactment of the federal statute. But these
procedures were rendered obsolete by the 19th century code-pleading reforms; the
reforms were thus eroding whatever convenient conformity in procedure had obtained
thitherto. The Conformity Act of 1872 substituted a continuing for a static conformity.
The Conformity Act was, however, merely the statement of a general rule, subject to
important exceptions, the most destructive of which were the Act's inapplicability in
equity and in criminal cases. See Clark, A New Federal Procedure, PROCEDURE: TfHE
HANDMAID OF JUSTICE 8 (C.A. Wright & H. Reasoner eds. 1960). C.A. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 61 (2d ed. 1970).
45 The House Committee, thinking to avoid impingement on local policy concerns
through rule-by-rule reference (where it thought necessary) to state law in H.R. 5463, has
remained insensitive to this point, however.
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judges from state to state to meet temporary litigation
pressures and thus would accommodate the strong administrative tendency towards a more integrated and
efficient federal judicial system. It gives recognition to a
growing national bar practicing in the federal courts
and the desirability of making it easier for both lawyers
and their national clients to find an equal grade of
justice administered by familiar procedure in any federal court in the country. Where federal substantive
policies are being enforced, a more uniform policy is
fairer and more predictable and is likely to strengthen
and bind the nation together.4 6
But it is puzzling to find that Judge Weinstein regards these
arguments as convincing. First, those utilizing the rules will be
trial lawyers engaged in predominantly local practice,47 whose
need, as Judge Weinstein recognizes, will be for uniformity
between local and federal procedures,
not interstate
uniformity.48 State evidentiary law is what all lawyers have had to
learn in preparation for state bar examinations and state court
practice. Although a few interstate agreements allow the lawyers
of one state to practice in another, it remains the general
experience that trial lawyers are reluctant to accept out-of-state
cases. Even where a state court admits out-of-state lawyers to
practice pro hac vice, an out-of-state lawyer is considered, and
probably considers himself, to be at a disadvantage, chiefly for
intangible reasons having as much to do with local prejudices as
with local procedural variations. It is fair to say that the preferred technique, for lawyers with "national clients" (to use
49
Judge Weinstein's phrase) as for others, is to obtain by referral
counsel experienced in the courts where a case is to be tried.
98.

46 Weinstein, supra note 10, at 359. See also 1962 Preliminary Report, supra note 10, at
47

Cf. Leach, State Law of Evidence in FederalCourts, 43 HARV. L. REv. 554, 584 (1930):
It has been suggested that [application of state evidence law) puts too great a
burden on federal judges who must sit in several jurisdictions and who must
therefore become familiar with several varying systems of state law .... But...
the hardship on the federal judge is no greater than the hardship placed on the
bar by an absence of conformity, and is probably less in view of the fact that
counsel have the duty of informing the court on matters peculiar to their state
law.
4 See Weinstein, supra note 10, at 358; Hearings, supra note 1, at 481 (testimony of
Stuart H. Johnson), 200, 202-03, 210 (testimony of George A. Spiegelberg, American
College of Trial Lawyers), 209 (testimony of Robert L. Cgare, Jr., New York Trial
Lawyers Committee), 168, 170 (statement of Charles R. Halpern and George T. Frampton, Jr., Washington Council of Lawyers). See also id. 62 (remarks of Representative
William L. Hungate, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary).
4 Cavers, Change in Choice-of-Law Thinking and Its Bearing on the Klaxon Problem, in

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 154, 158 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963) (not incorporated into final draft).
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This is especially so since trial of an out-of-state case will entail a
lawyer's leaving his family, his practice and the facilities of his
office for an open-ended period of time. 50 Since procedural
variations are not an important cause of this pattern, implementation of uniform rules of evidence in federal courts would not
seem likely to alter it.
Second, federal trial judges are largely drawn from the bar
of the state in which their court sits, and are familiar with state
practice. 51 Judge Weinstein's argument .that visiting federal
judges52 would be assisted by uniformity5 3 cannot be considered
compelling in view of the relative infrequency of visits required
54
by genuine emergency.
Finally, Judge Weinstein's argument that federal evidentiary
law would make uniform the administration of federal substantive law overlooks the extensive concurrent jurisdiction of federal questions exercised by state courts and their sizable exclusive
jurisdiction over numerous federal questions as to which it
cannot be alleged that the amount in controversy exceeds
$10,000. Thus, the arguments that federal courts need interstate
uniformity in their evidence rules are at bottom unpersuasive.
Although commentators have often called for reform of federal
evidentiary practices, the serious problem is not that these
practices have not been uniform from state to state. Evidentiary
law is criticized generally because it is cumbersome and
overrefined. 55 Federal evidentiary law is criticized in addition
because, under the various headings of federal jurisdiction, it has
not been clear how or when state law will be applied. 5 6 But this
50 These last considerations. would seem to make the techisique of referral preferable, where circumstances permit, to the technique of arranging for local co-counsel.
"'See E. MORGAN, J. MAGUIRE & J. WEINSTEIN, CASES ON EVIDENCE 258 (4th ed.
1957); Weinstein, supra note 10, at 358. Cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, § 138.
5'See 28 U.S.C. § 292(d) (Supp. 1973). Based on informal interviews it is the
author's understanding that udges consider such sittings to be in the nature of honorific
pleasure travel when they take the form of casual exchanges of location, and that there
are few occasions when the appointment of a visiting judge is required by the illness or
death5 5 of another judge.
But cf. note 47 supra.
( 4 See Weinstein, s
note 10, at 358. But see, e.g., Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Kendall,
167 F. 62, 70 (1909); 'Callahan & Ferguson, supra note 25, at 644; Estes, The Need for
Uniform Rules of Evidence in the Federat Courts, 24 F.R.D. 331, 335 (1959), quoting 1962
Prellminary Report, supra note 10, at 111-12.
" See J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE: ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw,
527-28 (1898); Degnan, supra note 12, at 275-76; Graham, Caloirnia's'Restatement" Of
Evidence: Some Reflections On AP eIlat Repair 0f The Codification Fiasco, 4 LOYOLA U.L.A.L.
REv. 279, 287, 307 (197 1); 0ifield, Unifr Rules Of Evidence, 67 DICK. L. REv. 381, 382
(1963). Cf. People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964).
56 See 1962 PreliminaryReport, supra note 10, at 95-97; Degnan, supra note 12, at 276;
Ladd, supra note 12, at 715. Compare Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 406-09
(5th Cir. 1960), with Allstate Ins. Co. v. Charneski, 286 F.2d 238, 243-44 (7th Cir. 1960).
See generally Comment, Rule 43(a) and Erie-The Conflict in the Sixth Circuit, 34 TENN. L.
REv. 671 (1971).
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problem is a matter amenable to amelioration by simpler means
57
than adoption of a comprehensive federal evidence code.
B.

Unification of Practice Under All
Federal Jurisdictional Headings

There is a genuine, even pressing, need to unify rules
governing the reception of evidence among the various headings
of federal jurisdiction.5 The present evidentiary rules vary depending upon whether the case is civil 59 or criminal60 and, if the

former, whether the case is in diversity or under some other
heading of federal jurisdiction. 6 1 However, unification could be
achieved, legislatively or through amendment to the procedural
rules, by a simple federal choice-of-law rule requiring conformity
to forum-state evidentiary rules for all federal jurisdictional
headings, a suggestion further explored in Section VI. Thus,
there would seem to be no need for comprehensive new federal
evidentiary law to solve the problem.
C. Effectuation of FederalJury Policies

The argument has been made 62 that rules of evidence in
federal courts should be federal rules because control over
evidence is one of the important ways a judge controls a jury,
and the relation between a federal judge and jury is an area of
strong federal concern.63 However, this relationship would seem
to be protected by the existing body of law addressed to the
subject. There is no question, for example, that even if conformity to state evidentiary law were to be legislatively mandated for
all headings of federal jurisdiction, a federal judge would con'7 See text accompanying notes 58-61 infra; Section VI infra.
5"See authorities cited note 56 supra.
"See
generally, 1962 Preliminary Report, supra note 10, at 89.
60

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26, codifing Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933) (rules
of evidence in federal criminal cases to be determined uniformly by federal courts under
general common law in light of reason and experience).
01 The practice in federal question cases has been to follow federal decisional law.
Independent bodies of federal evidentiary law were developed in bankruptcy and in
admiralty prior to the merger of the Bankruptcy Rules with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1939, General Orders in Bankruptcy 22, 37, 305 U.S. 692, 698 (1939), and
the merger of admiralty with civil actions generally in 1966, FED. R. Civ. P. 1. Thereafter
it was generally believed that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a) was applicable in
these jurisdictions. In practice, federal question cases have continued to make scant use
of state
evidentiary law. See Weinstein, supra note 10, at 377 (Sherman Appendix).
62
ee Degnan, supra note 12, at 292-96.
"See U.S. CONsr. amend. VII; Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16
(1963); Simler v. Connor, 372 U.S. 221 (1963); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469
(1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1958); Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283
U.S. 91 (1931); FED. R. Civ. P. 38.
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tinue under preexisting, overriding law64 to enjoy the freedom
to comment upon the evidence, unless it could be shown that it
was the intention of the legislature to effect a change in that
practice. 65 Thus, there is no pressing need for the elaboration of
a federal code of evidence to protect traditional federal jury
arrangements.
D. Enhancement of the Federal Forum
The bare provision of a federal forum is thought to effectuate important national interests in the quality and availability
of justice. 66 It is therefore thought desirable to adopt rules, such
as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which may make federal
jurisdiction more useful-provide a juster justice. 67 A thoroughly
reformed and sophisticated code of evidence, representing the
best in current thinking on the subject, would presumably enhance the usefulness and prestige of federal courts. This argument, and the related argument discussed in Subsection E,
following, that federal evidence rules would serve as a model for
state reform, would have persuasive weight, if their underlying
premise were sound: that the proposed rules, as promulgated,
represent genuine modernization of the law of evidence.
Undoubtedly the proposed rules represent a sophisticated,
scholarly, often wise weighing of the various interests to be
accommodated in any evidentiary ruling. But there is little in the
rules of evidence now applied in either federal or state courts
that is seriously claimed to be foolish or illiberal. 68 In fact it is

' 4 See

Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1899); Vicksburg & Meridan
R.R. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545, 553 (1886); County of Todd v. Loegering, 297 F.2d 470,
480-81 (8th Cir. 1961).
6 Other rules of evidence, to the'extent that they reflect strong national policy
concerns, are also the subect of preexisting overriding constitutional and statutory law.
See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1731-45 (1970).
See Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965); AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL

COURTS 4 (1965); VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 32, at 1009; Friendly, Historic
Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REv. 483 (1928).
rPrior to
e drafting of the proposed rules, the most frequently articulated
argument in favor of establishing such rules was that of improving the efficiency of the
federal courts. See, e.g., 1962 Preliminary Report, supra note 10, at 108-10; Callahan &
Ferguson, supra note 25, at 645-46; Degnan, The Feasibility of Rules of Evidence in Federal
Courts, 24 F.R.D. 341 (1960); Estes, supra note 54, at 335, 339; Joiner, Uniform Rules of
Evidencefor the Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D. 429, 440 (1957); Orfield, supra note 55, at 381-83.
Professor Ladd stated: "The promulgation of unified, simplified and improved federal
rules of evidence, when completed, can be one of the great contributions of this century
to our system of trials." Ladd, supra note 12, at 716. See also Green, supra nooe 12, at 1-2;
Weinstein, supra note 10, at 354-55. As the quotation from Professor Ladd illustrates, the
arguments for more efficient federal evidence practices do not usually separate the
considerations of unification of evidence rules under all heads of federal jurisdiction, text
accompanying notes 58-61 supra, and general progress in simplifying the law of evidence
itself,6 8the topic of this Subsection.
See Leach, supra note 47, at 583-84 (1930); cf. Weinstein, supra note 10, at 359.
Judge Weinstein argues that the tendency in the state courts to turn to the Uniform
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fair to say that the proposed rules simply take positions with
respect to the rules of evidence generally obtaining.6 9 That they
may be the best conceivable positions is possible, but what is
needed in this context is simplification, not sophistication and
refined elaboration. 70 And simplification is not a feature of the
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. 7 1 No proponent of the
proposed rules asserts that they are anything other than another
detailed, scholarly code. 2
Indeed, the usefulness of both federal and state courts may
well be impaired by enactment of the proposed rules, for they
will simply represent another set of rules for local trial lawyers to
master. The existence of two such procedural systems side by
side, where one does not represent a marked simplification,
prima facie will not enhance the usefulness of either set of
courts, but at best will create a minor forum-shopping situation
and at worst Will introduce confusion and doubt into the trial of
cases in all courts.
E. Model for Reform of State Rules: Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Distinguished
This brings us to the argument, often advanced, that new
federal evidentiary rules would serve as a model for widespread
reform. 3 It was an unachieved goal of federal policy under Swift
v. Tyson 74 that federal law serve as a model for state law
reform.7 5 Arguably, state procedural reform remains a goal of
national policy today. There is a national interest in improvement of procedures in all courts because there is a national
Rules of Evidence, the Model Code of Evidence, and other enlightened sources, indicates
that the gap between federal and state evidence rules will be slight. Id. 360-61.
69See Broun, Authentication and Contents of Writings, 1969 LAW & Soc. ORDER 611;
Green, Relevancy and ItsLimits, 1969 LAW & Soc. ORDER 533. See generally Sections IV, V,
infra; Hearings, supra note 1, at 195, 197-99 (letter from Professor Kenneth Graham). The
positions taken in various of the proposed rules will of course tend to differ in detail
from any particular state rule; see, e.g., Section V infra.
70
7 See Section IV infra.
1See, e.g., Broun, supra note 69; Davis,JudicialNotice, 1969 LAw & Soc. ORDER 513;
Green, supra note 69; Hearings, supra note 1, at 197-98.
72See Blackmar, The Proposed FederalRules of Evidence-How Will They Affect the Trial
0f Cases, 27 WASH. & LEE L. R~v. 17, 21 (1970); Green, supra, note 12, at 41. Indeed,
according to Blackmar, "The proposed rules are often more conservative than the Model
Code or the Uniform Rules." Blackmar, supra, at 20. Cj Green, supra note 69, at 533. See
also Hearings, supra note 1, at 17, 24, 25 (testimony ofJudge Albert B. Mars, Chairman,
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the
United States); text accompanying notes 73-108 infra. See generally UNIFORM RULES OF
EVIDENCE; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942).
73See 1962 Preliminary Report, supra note 10, at 90; Hearings, supra note 1, at 287-88
(statement of Department of.justice); Callahan & Ferguson, supra note 25, at 646; Joiner,
supra note 67, at 439-40; Weinstein, supra note 10, at 360; cf. Clark, The Influence of
Federal ProceduralReform, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 144 (1948).
7441 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
75Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).
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interest in the sound administration of justice. Moreover, wide
state adoption of rules based upon federal rules could contribute
importantly to solving the problem of the need of the trial bar
for intrastate conformity. The analogy is, of course, to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 76 As precedent for the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at first
blush, may seem so persuasive as to be conclusive. 7 But there
are significant functional differences between the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the proposed Rules of Evidence which
strongly suggest that the evidence rules would not enjoy nearly
the .same success in generating reform of state practices.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gave to federal courts
great procedural advantages over most state courts; these advantages still exist in states which have not yet enacted substantially
the same rules. The draftsmen of the rules did not merely take
positions or make choices among the available panoply of procedural rules, from among which any choice might well have
been a good one as long as there was some generally accepted
procedural framework. Rather, they abolished for federal courts
whole classes of distinctions, requirements, limitations. Instead of
codifying complex preexisting rules concerning jointness of obligation and sameness of form of action, for example, the federal
rule on joinder of actions simply provided that a party may join
"as many claims... as he has against an opposing party." 8 The
regulatory job previously done by a welter of confusing distinctions was given under rule 42 to the sound discretion of federal
judges in shaping a case for trial. Generally state pleading
reform had not gone so far. Similarly the federal rules cut off
the pleadings at the answer, abolishing pleas and demurrers;79
the job of narrowing and sharpening the issues for trial,
thitherto accomplished by pleading, was relegated to a handful
of discovery devices, and to provisions for motion practice.
This sort of drastic simplification of procedure clearly outweighed the inconvenience to lawyers of learning another set of
rules.8 0 Trial lawyers like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
76Similar rules have been adopted in more than half the states. See Moynihan,
Preface, MASSACHUSETrS

PROPOSED RULES OF TRIAL AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE (1971).

77Yet well into this century conformity to state court procedures-although never
adequately effectuated-was the goal of federal procedural reform. The history of the
various conformity acts reveals the stages in the struggle to reach that goal. See notes
43-44 supra & accompanying text.
78 FED. R. CIv. P. 18. See id. Rule 13 (counterclaims).
79
80 1d. Rules 7(a), (c); 12.
ee Weinstein, supra note 10, at 359: "[T]he federal civil rules provide such a
substantial improvement over much state practice that state practice has drifted toward
the national pattern."
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They appreciate that they do not have to demur or plead in
abatement or bar, but may file a catchall answer and do the rest
by way of motion. They also appreciate the provisions for counterclaims free of complex rules differentiating set-off and
recoupment,8 ' the orderly and powerful discovery procedures,
and the availability of liberal devices for joinder of claims. Even
the rules for joinder of parties, though still failing to simplify the
law to the extent done with respect to joinder of claims, represent a significant improvement over state law. 2 Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the freedom with which
amendments are permitted virtually eliminates the problems of
variance, 83 and the teeth have been drawn from such formal
requirements as the real-party-in-interest rule.8 4 In sum, under
the federal rules, parties contemplate a vastly simplified litigational process, involving a brief pleading stage, a busy period of
discovery and a hopefully dispositive motion for judgment; thus
prepared for settlement, the parties often view trial as unnecessary, indeed, anticlimactic. Such a model has become the norm in
our country, and the nineteenth century system now seems
aberrational, formalistic, and full of traps.
It would be unduly conclusory to minimize, without a detailed scrutiny beyond the scope of this Article, the achievement
that the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence represent. But
based on a fair reading of the proposed rules one may conclude
that, apart from their scholarly refinement and sophistication,
little can be said for them along the lines of the foregoing
85
appraisal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Probably the major reason for this difference is that the
avowed purpose of the draftsmen of the proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence was to limit, rather than to open up, the discretion
of a trial judge. 6 The draftsmen believed that the settlement of
cases and the preparation of unsettled cases for trial would be
facilitated by detailed rules clarifying from the outset what could
and what could not be admitted into evidence.

"8 2 FED.
1d.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85 See
ORDER

R. Civ. P. 13.
Rules 19-21 & accompanying commentary.
Rule 15.
Rules 15, 17.
generally, Sy7nposium on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1969 LAW & Soc.

509.

Spangenberg, sura note 1, at 1061, 1070-71 (1969) (The Advisory Committee
made "a major policy decision not to "state broad general principles" but to make the
code "meticulous and detailed"; a major consideration was the fact that "ninety-five
percent of civil tort cases are settled without trial," and a "system of evidence rules which
would enlarge the discretion of the judge would diminish predictability so severely that
settlements would be less likely").
86

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:594

It is the premise of such a view that discovery will have told
the adversaries enough that the admissibility of crucial evidence
may be thrown into the scales at the time of settlement negotiations. Or if the case goes to trial, the presumption is that
discovery and settlement negotiations together will have told the
adversaries enough that, if required, they can argue admissibility
to the court based on comprehensive advance preparation.
This premise would seem to overlook special problems of
litigation in federal criminal cases to which the new rules will
apply; 87 the exigencies of the rapidly expanding injunction litigation in the federal courts; and the continuing possibilities for
surprise in trial of ordinary civil cases. 88 These matters are
discussed more fully below. 89 For purposes of the present discussion it would seem at least reasonable to suppose that rules of
evidence must work at the trial of cases and not only during
settlement negotiations or in the preparation of pretrial office
memoranda. If that is so, then the exigencies of the trial situation would seem to call for something other than what the
proposed rules contemplate: remitting counsel and a court with
minimum discretion to repeated consultation of a detailed
rulebook.
Apart from the desire to limit judicial discretion in this
context, the proposed rules also exhibit an intention to effectuate
the important concerns of the litigants and of the system, in
particular to preserve the jury from irrelevance, confusion and
prejudice. The accumulated wisdom and scholarship of the past
have been carefully saved and applied to each of the traditional
headings of evidentiary rules. But it evidently did not appear to
the draftsmen that radical simplification of the evidentiary rules
might be accomplished without violence to those concerns and
without disregard of the old learning.
To use again the example formerly given from the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the considerations that used to control
whether or not a party might plead two claims together are now
surely effectuated under rule 42, allowing arrangements for
separate trial; what is gained in the process is not only
simplification of pleading, but perhaps a greater protection of
the underlying policies. In contrast, the proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence conform to established patterns. The rules govern7 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 101, 56 F.R.D. 194.
8Id. Cf. id. Rule 901(a), Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 332-33 (observing that
contingencies may arise in ordinary civil litigation).
so See Section IV infra; text accompanying notes 153, 175 infra.
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ing the reception of hearsay evidence, for example, take the
approach generally prevailing that hearsay is inadmissible but
that there are a great many exceptions.9" The more than thirty
enumerated exceptions in three categories 9' exhaust the catalog
of exceptions generally prevailing under state law, and there are
academic niceties of distinction throughout. 92 And yet it lay with
the draftsmen to take the path of trusting properly instructed
93
federal juries and the informed discretion of federal judges
and by a stroke of the pen to make hearsay evidence, if probative, generally admissible. 9 4 Evidence proffered under such a
rule might be subject to the discretion of the court to keep it
out for the reasons underlying the old enumerated
exceptions-factors which the new rule, in the manner of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 and 23, for example, might
carefully set forth.
Other ways of making the rules of evidence simpler were
equally available to the Advisory Committee. The kind of quibbling for which the proposed hearsay rules lay the basis might
95
well have been obviated for trial to the court in nonjury cases,
perhaps by the drafting of a set of minimal protective provisions.
90H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 42 U.S.L.W. 10, would amend article
VIII in some details.
91Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 801, 56 F.R.D. 293 (by way of definition); id. Rule 803, 56
F.R.D. 300 (containing exceptions as to which the availability of the declarant is immaterial); id. Rule 804, 56 F.R.D. 300 (containing exceptions applicable when the
declarant is unavailable).

See, e.g., id. Rule 801 (a)(2), 56 F.R.D. 300. Cf.Graham, supra note 55, at 288:
The issue of whether non-assertive conduct is or is not hearsay is one that,
while being beaten to death by the writers, would probably not be recognized in
practice by more than 1% of the lawyers and judges in this state. Indeed,
perhaps for this reason, there are only a handful of appellate cases that present
the issue. Nonetheless, the drafters of the [California Evidence] Code take great
pride in having settled once and for all this burning question.
(citations omitted).
93 Graham, supra note 55, at 307: "The needs of reform have been dear for the last
half-century: simplification of the rules, a presumption in favor of admissibility of
evidence,
and a farge measure of discretion in the trial judge."
94
See generally Ladd, The Relationshipof the Principlesof ExclusionaryRules of Evidence to
the Problem of Proof, 18 MINN. L. Rv.506 (1934); Loevinger, Facts, Evidence and Legal
Proof, 9 WESTERN RES. L. REv. 154 (1958); Weinstein, ProbativeForce of Hearsay, 46 IOWA
L. REv. 331 (1961).
The Advisory Committee rejected this approach to hearsay "as involving too great a
92

measure of judicial discretion, minimizing the p~redictability of rulings, enhancing the

difficulties of preparation for trial
....and requiring substantially different rules for civil
and crifninal cases." Proposed Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D.
290. The .functional consideration last noted is subject to the observation that the

divergence required by the sixth amendment would merely parallel the existing di-

vergence now required-by the fourth and fifth amendments, and preexisting statutory
and rule material applicable only in federal prosecutions, e.1, Jencks Act,"18 U. S.C.
§ 3500 (1970). Morfeovest"it may be desirable to develop more liberal hearsay rules in civil
than in criminal cases,xartkularly in trials to the court alone. In England the Civil
Evidence Act of 1968 rIriders hearsay generally admissible in civil cases subject to notice
provisions.
Civil Evjdet'
Act of I68, c.64 §§ 1-10.
95
See Daiis,.Hearsay in Nonjury Cases, 83 HARV. L. Rv. 1362 (1970).
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Although important policies argue against allowing the trier of
fact to hear what it is improper, for him to consider, in view of
the requirement of offers of proof 9 6 it is transparent that the
judge will at least know about such material in any event.
Other possibilities, on a lesser scale, present themselves. In
lieu of the detailed limitations of proposed Article VI upon
impeachment of witnesses, impeaching proof might have been
made generally admissible subject to the court's discretion to cut
it off on familiar relevancy analysis..9 7 Proposed Article IX on
authentication of documentary and similar proof, and proposed
Article X on the use of copies and originals, both present a
formidable congeries of things for a trial lawyer to know and to
line up with applicable hearsay provisions; yet it would seem
possible to admit such evidence initially and then subject it (in
the few instances where prior stipulation of authenticity has been
unable to clear up a doubt) to the arts of the cross-examiner, to
enable the trier to evaluate authenticity and related questions.
This is not to state categorically -hat any or all of these steps
would in the end have been wist, but only to point out that at
least they would have paralleled the kind of radical simplification
of practice that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ushered in.
It is probable that the conservatism of the new evidentiary
rules is traceable in part to the experience of the draftsmen of
the Model Code of Evidence.98 It was widely believed 9 9 that the
Model Code of Evidence had failed to achieve enactment in any
state because it was too radical. The Commissioners drafting the
Uniform Rules of Evidence'"0 sought to succeed in furnishing a
model for reform of state law by restating rather than revolutionizing existing evidentiary rules. 10 Although the Uniform Rules also failed to achieve reform of state law,' 0 2 the
suggestion that the new Federal Rules of Evidence be based in
"6Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 103(2), 56 F.R.D. 194-95.
Cf Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 767-68 (D.C. Cir. 1965); CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 788 (West 1966). Luck has been overruled in the District of Columbia, however, see
Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89 (D.C. App. 1972), and has been rejected elsewhere,
see, e~g.,
United States v. Garrison, 348 F. Supp. 1112, 1129 (E.D. La. 1972).
98
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942).
99
See UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Prefatory Note 161 (1953).
100
Id. (1953).
"'1See id. Prefatory Note 161.
192 No state has adopted the Model Code. Only Kansas, the Canal Zone, and the
Virgin Islands have substantially adopted the Uniform Rules. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-401
to 60-470 (1964); C. Z. CODE, tit. 5, §§ 2731-2996 (1963); V.I. CODE ANN., tit. 5, §§
77.1-956 (1967). Although the Uniform Rules of Evidence were the point of departure
for recent enactments in California and New Jersey, those enactments are much modified
to conform to particular state policies and traditions. "It is by now quite apparent that the
Uniform Rules of Evidence have no chance of being enacted as uniform legislation in all
the states." Spangenberg, supra note 1, at 1066. The reasons for lawyers' general
resistance to codification of the law of evidence are discussed in Section IV ifmra.
97
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part upon the Uniform Rules of Evidence' 0 3 has probably been
carried out;' 0 4 in addition, state law materials and the newer

codes have also been utilized, lending the proposed rules as
much the aspect of a restatement as had the Uniform Rules.

Thus, the real precedent of the proposed federal evidence
rules is not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but the Uniform Rules of Evidence, and similar materials. The states have

shown some interest in adopting the proposed federal evidence
rules: the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws is preparing an adaptation for state court use;' 0 5 the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin is expected to adopt a modified
version of the proposed rules; the Supreme Court of New
Mexico has already done so; and Nevada adopted the 1971
preliminary draft with modifications.' 0 6 But if the history of state
adoption of the Uniform Rules of Evidence and the Model Code
of Evidence' 07 is any guide, this early showing will not in fact
develop into a significant trend. 08
F.

Summary

Thus, the arguments generally advanced as favoring new
federal evidentiary rules are unpersuasive. No need for uniformity can be made out, other than for uniformity over the various
federal jurisdictional headings, a job that can be accomplished
without promulgation of a full-blown federal code of evidence.
Nor has any such simplification of evidentiary law been accomplished by the proposed rules as would justify their promulgation to serve as a model for state reform, and thus indirectly as a
route to conformity. The following sections will explore the
103

See 1962 Preliminary Report, supra note 10, at 1,10; Estes, supra note 54, at 335;
Joiner, supra note 67, at 431.
104 See, e.g., Ladd, supra note 12, at 716 n.65; Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 103(a), 106,
201(b), 406(b), 407, 408, 411, 507, 607, 701, 704, 801, 1008, Advisory Comm. Notes, 56
F.R.D. 195, 200, 204, 225, 225-26, 227-28, 230, 249, 266-67, 281, 284-85, 293-99, 347.
103 Hearings,supra note 1, at 352 (testimony of Frank F. Jestrab, National Conference
of Commissioners
of Uniform State Laws).
10 6
Id. 546 (reply statement of Professor Edward W. Cleary, Reporter to the Advisory
Committee on Rules of Evidence, Judicial Conference of the United States).
107 It might be argued that since the less radical Uniform Rules have been more
successful in attracting the states than the Model Code, see note 102 supra, the proposed
rules would stand a better chance of adoption by the states the more they adheIred to
established positions. Cf. Blackmar, supra note 72, at 20: "The proposed rules are often
more conservative than the Model Code or the Uniform Rules. Perhaps it is felt that a
proposal of this nature has a better chance for adoption." If this means, however, that a
very conservative federal model might immediately attract the same number of followers
as have the Uniform Rules, then the argument is correct, but unimportant.
108 It is possible that use of the proposed rules by federal courts will make them more
attractive than the Uniform Rules could have been as a model. But it is unlikely that this
consideration could outweigh the disadvantages of evidentiary codification. Cf Graham,
supra note 55. Even the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under no such disadvantages,
have failed to be adopted by almost half the states, 35 years after their promulgation.
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proposition that absent such conformity, a detailed code of
sophisticated, scholarly new federal evidentiary rules may well
contribute to the difficulties of trial lawyers in both sets of courts.

IV.

DISADVANTAGES

OF UNIFORM FEDERAL EVIDENCE RULES:

EVIDENCE DISTINGUISHED

A.

FROM PROCEDURE GENERALLY

Unanticipated Evidence and the Necessity of
Instantaneous Grasp of Evidence Rules
at Trial

Economy of federal lawmaking effort to one side, it would
appear that the argument for conformity of federal court procedures to forum state rules has historically been based for the
most part upon the consideration of convenience to the trial bar.
Prior to 1938 it had always been understood that trials in all
courts could most conveniently be handled by reference to a
single set of procedural rules which was uniform within a particular state. 10 9
Evidentiary rules present a more imperative case for intrastate conformity than do other rules of pleading and practice.
The feature that distinguishes many rules of evidence from rules
of civil procedure generally is that the former tend to call for
split-second discriminations in application." 0 An objection to
evidence or an argument in support of proffered but arguably
objectionable evidence must be made quickly or waived."' A
ruling upon objected-to evidence must be made at once by a
judge under pressure to avoid error. Although a lawyer can
familiarize himself at his leisure with procedural rules governing
such things as the filing of pleadings, and even with evidentiary
rules governing anticipated proof, the lawyer who is confronted
with unforeseen testimony, or whose witness is confronted with
unforeseen examination, or who finds that he has unforeseen
evidence to offer, must know at once whether these are objectionable or supportable.
It is necessary at this point to meet the implicit argument of
the draftsmen of the proposed rules that evidentiary issues do
not come as a surprise to trial lawyers: counsel have had discovery, so they know what the evidence will be; they have attempted
109

See notes 43-44 supra & accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, § 138, comment a (1971), reproduced at text
accompanying note 139 infra; Estes, supra note 54, at 331-32; McCormick, The New Code
o
ience of the American Law Institute, 20 TEx. L. REv. 661, 662 (1942); cf Chicago &
N.W. Ry. v. Kendall, 167 F. 62, 70 (8th Cir. 1909).
l Subject to the plain error rule, codified in proposed rule 101(d).
'See
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settlement and in the course of negotiations have learned the
nature of each other's objections to the evidence; they have had
time to research and prepare evidentiary arguments for the
benefit of the court. In this view, the real value of evidentiary
rules is to help settle cases by making evidentiary issues predictable in outcome, and elaborately detailed rules can best accom12
plish that result.'
But it would seem that the possibilities of surprise in trial of
cases have not been fully appreciated by the draftsmen. First,
their view appears to have minimized the special circumstances
obtaining in the federal criminal jurisdiction, to which the proposed rules will apply.' 3 Criminal cases do not profit from the
civil discovery devices; indeed, the Constitution protects criminal
defendants from much discovery; 1 4 rule 16 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure is limited in scope and can be conditioned
on discovery by the defense; and the prosecution is required to
divulge certain matters only at trial." 5 Additionally, the decision
whether to settle a criminal case (that is, whether to negotiate a
plea of guilty) fairly depends upon other factors; and, where
evidentiary factors enter, they are likely to be of constitutional
dimension, and thus beyond the scope of the proposed rules of
evidence."16 Moreover-to take a realistic view-many criminal
defenses are prepared by a specialized bar, members of which
are often under the pressure of caseloads which must sharply
confine their pretrial investigations.
Second, the draftsmen also appear to have overlooked the
important jurisdiction exercised by federal courts today over
actions for injunctive relief, a jurisdiction increasingly busy as
new classes of plaintiffs explore new remedial possibilities. With
far greater frequency than in the past, evidentiary hearings are
convened on short notice to consider applications for temporary
and preliminary relief against hospitals, prisons, school boards,
corporations and other institutions. Little or no formal discovery
will have been previously available to litigants in such cases, nor
will all important evidence be available in advance; it is the very
nature of these applications for injunctive relief that they are
prosecuted with dispatch under the alleged threat of imminent,
See text accomlaning note 86 supra.
Fed. R. vi . 1101, 56 F.R.D. 347. The following textual observations
are also applicable in varying degrees to state courts. Note that FED. R. CRIM. P. 16
ameliorates the orthodox position to some extent, by providing for limited discovery in
federal criminal cases.
114See, e.g., Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944) (fifth amendment).
115
CJ.encks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
16
1
JjProposed Fed. R. Evid. 403 & Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 218-19.
112

113 Proposed
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irreparable harm. Furthermore, under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure such proceedings may terminate the litigation by
117
consolidation with trial on the merits.
Finally, the draftsmen seem to have unduly discounted the
continuing possibilities for surprise in trial of ordinary civil
cases." 8 A question or line of examination at trial may be
unanticipated; witness subpoenas duces tecum may turn up
documentary proof uninvestigated by either party; 1 19 hearsay
testimony may be injected despite the conscientiously worded
questions of counsel. 2 ° Considering these kinds of problems, it
may be fairly agreed that in any evidentiary hearing lawyers do
feel the necessity to react quickly to unanticipated objectionable
evidence and to their adversaries' unanticipated objections.
B.

Confusion Developed by Parallel Systems
of Evidence Rules in Federal
and State Courts

This necessity for speed has tended to render lawyers'
habitual reactions to evidence unresponsive to change.12 ' It is
anticipated that a new set of evidentiary rules may not be
completely utilizable for this reason, at least by this generation of
trial lawyers. 1 22 The necessity for speed in reaction may account
for the noted tendency 123 of some trial lawyers to make ineffective use of even the established rules of evidence. Courtroom
observation demonstrates that lawyers object to evidence on
1" FED. R.- Civ. P. 65(a)(2). Nor have the proposed rules distinguished injunction
cases by allowing for more flexible evidentiary standards in cases tried to the court. Cf
Davis, supra note 95.
U But cf. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 901(a), Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 333
(observing that "contingencies" may arise in ordinary civil litigation requiring proof of
authentication or identification); id. Rule 1001, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 217
("unanticipated document").
u Based on the author's observation, it is common for lawyers to neglect discovery
and even informal pretrial investigation along certain lines for tactical reasons; the hope
is to turn up favorable surprises at trial. Thus, in a recent trial involving mental damage
to a minor, the school nurse and principal were questioned for the first time by the
defense on the stand, and testified that the plaintiff was lying if she said she had had
fainting fits at school. Malone v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Civil No. 67-844G (D. Mass.,
Mar. 31, 1970). The "unanticipated document" is recognized in Proposed Fed. R. Evid.
1001, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 217.
1"o See text accompanying note 175 infra.
121 The familiar example is the taking of exceptions in federal court despite FED. R.
Civ. P. 46, abolishing exceptions. See Weinstein, supra note 10, at 360.
1 See Weinstein, supra note 10, at 360: "Within the courtroom the lawyer's . . .
almost involuntary reflexive action . . . will not be radically and immediately affected,
whatever the new rule."
123 See Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, 5 VAND. L. REv. 277 (1952);
Graham, supra note 55, at 280-86; 1962 PreliminaryReport, supra note 10, at 109, citing
Estes, supra note 54, at 11; Report of the Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence, 63
A.B.A. REP. 570, 576 (1938).
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nonexistent grounds; for example, the evidence is said to be
"incompetent" or "self-serving."' 24 That even the most up-todate code may present subtleties of scholarly analysis 125 which
lawyers cannot remember or employ under pressure may explain why lawyers tend to make little use of codifications of the
law of evidence.' 26 Judges, for similar reasons, have sometimes
27
administered evidentiary law with suprising flexibility.'
For such reasons the argument for reform of the law of
evidence is for the most part directed at the elaboration, bulk
and complexity of existing rules, 28 and no substantial authority
has hitherto taken the position that predictability is such an
overriding desideratum that reform should lie in the direction of
greater elaboration, bulk or complexity. "What is lamented is
[the] infinitesimal, meticulous, petty elaboration into a mass not
capable of being perfectly mastered and used by everyday judges
and the practitioners."' 2 9 The draftsmen of the proposed rules
also gave it as one of their original goals to simplify the law of

evidence.' 30

3
That they have failed in that goal may fairly be argued.1 '

But there is the further consideration that, whether or not one
regards the proposed rules as simple, the rules will have to be
learned by trial lawyers in addition to the rules they will continue
to employ in state court trials.' 2 In furnishing additions and
exceptions for one context only, the proposed rules inescapably
contribute to the complexity, as well as the sheer bulk, of the
124 See Graham, supra note 55, at 281.

125
See id. 287: A lawyer examining some parts of the California Evidence Code "is
hard 26
put to know whether he is examining the work product of lawyers or theologians."
1 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 209, 211,248, 300; Graham,supra note 55, at 279
(California Evidence Code). Cf note 102 supra & accompanying text (discussing failure of
the Uniform
Code of Evidence to achieve wide state enactment).
27
' See J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMIlON LAw
527-29. Judge Augustus Hand claimed to have admitted all probative evidence routinely
without reversal on appeal. See 19 ALl PROCEEDINGS 225 (1942); Clark, Forward to the
Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 10 RUTGERS L. REv. 479, 480 (1956). See also
Estes, sup-a note 54, at 334 (maing the same claim); Graham, supra note 55, at 299. Cf,
e.g., People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 8N8, 389 P.2d 377,36 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964) (ruling that
California hearsay rule does not exclude evidence necessary to the 'penal interest" of
finding "truth").
'IN See 1962 Preliminay Report, supra note 10, at 109; Report of the Committee on
Improvements in the Law of Evidnce, supra note 123, at 576-77.
i29Report of the Committee on Improvements in the Law ofEvidence, supra note 123, at 576.

See also Estes, supra note 54, at 332.

3I See 1962 PreliminaryReport, supra note 10, at

at 716.

108-10. See also Ladd, supra note 12,

Il See, e.g., Broun, supra note 69; Davis, supra note 71. Cf text accompanying notes
66-72 supra.

132 To the extent that this has always been the case in federal trials under FED. R.
Civ. P. 43(a) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 26, codification of detailed rules will operate only to
make the situation more acute and less subject to change. See text accompanying notes

141-79 infra, 126 supra.
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corpus of evidentiary rules. 133 That the draftsmen of the proposed rules have directed the application of state rules in some
instances, 134 or that certain of the proposed rules are bound to
coincide with state rules in some cases,' 3 5 does not ease the
fundamental difficulty of a trial lawyer's position in either set of
courts. When he is rising to his feet to object there is no time for
cogitation along the lines of: "Or is it the other way around?"
The functional considerations explored here are reflected in
the underlying rationale of the basic conflicts-of-law rule that
37
questions of evidence 36 are generally for the forum state.'
This rule is an expression of the fundamental desideratum of all
choices of law, that the law applied be characterized by "ease in
determination and application."'' 3 8 As the commentary to the
Second Restatement's evidence rule explains:
Considerations of efficiency and convenience require
that questions . . . of evidence . . . should usually be

determined by the local law of the forum. The trial
judge must make most evidentiary decisions with dispatch if the trial is to proceed with reasonable celerity.
The judge should therefore, as a general rule, apply the
local law of his own state.' 39
The following section will attempt to demonstrate, using
examples from the proposed rules, how they would tend to make
more difficult the determination and application of evidentiary
law in both sets of courts.
3 The proposed rules may also require analyses differing from those customarily
employed in arguing counterpart state rules, and may be characterized by differing
correlational patterns. See text accompanying note 176 infra.
134E.g., Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 302, 903, 56 F.R.D. 211, 340. H.R. 5463, supra note
7, would amend Rule 501 to the same end. See also Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 902(9), 56
F.R.D. 337. Despite the unfortunate terminology in the rule, presumably the Uniform
Coae would control. See id. Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 339.
Commercial
' 5 Compare, e.g., Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 705, 56 F.R.D. 285, with N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
§ 4515 (McKinney 1963).
136
See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, § 122 with respect to procedure generally.
13 7
RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, § 138.
138Id.'§ 6(g).
9

13 Id. § 138. This kind of result will be app~ropriate not only forprocedural conflicts
but even where the question is one of substantive law, whenever application of theoretically governing rules simply cannot be expected to work. For example, although the
Seconf Restatement takes the position that performance of a contract and validity of a
contract are governed by the same law, in the absence of effective stipulation by the
parties, id. § 188, details in performance of the contract (such as whether Monday
performance may be substituted for Sunday performance) are governed by the law of the
place of performance, id. § 206, illustration 2. A contrary rule simply will not work, for
example, in a state where Sunday performance is prohibited. So in the case of evidence
rules where functional analysis tends fairly to the conclusion that nonconformity to local
details of evidentiary law will not work, a contrary choice of uniform federal rules for
federal courts would seem by analogy to be not only unnecessary, but also incorrect. This
analogy was suggested by Professor Donald T. Trautman.
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V.

ANALYSIS

OF EXAMPLES FROM THE PROPOSED
14
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

Paradoxically (to those accustomed to the Erie viewpoint),
the problems outlined above may become more acute as evidentiary rules become less "substantive"' 4 1 in content and more arbitrary. Such rules, often statutory, typically prescribe precise
limitations upon the admissibility of a class of evidence.
A. Impeachment of Witnesses by Prior Criminal Convictions
A good example is furnished by the Massachusetts statute
providing for impeachment of a witness' credibility by proof of a
criminal conviction.' 4 2 Under this statute, the credibility of an
opponent's witness may be impeached by the record of a felony
conviction within ten years of its entry, or of a misdemeanor
conviction within five years of its entry. These time limitations do
not apply where another criminal conviction has occurred within
the ten or five years, respectively. In the case of a felony, where a
minimum term of imprisonment has been imposed, the ten-year
period runs from the date of expiration of the minimum term,
rather than from the date of judgment of conviction. No distinction is taken between crimen falsi and other crimes, although
some commentators believe that for purposes of impeaching
credibility the distinction ought to be made; 14 3 but it will be
agreed that the scheme here outlined is not unrefined. Where
impeachment of this kind comes as a surprise to the lawyer
summoning the witness-and, as we shall see, it frequently
does-he must test it at once against his memory of these details.
Under the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 144 a Massachusetts trial lawyer in the Federal District Court for the
14oThe version of the proposed rules which is analyzed in this Section is that
promulgated by the Supreme Court, Proposed Fed. R. Evid., 56 F.R.D. 183. H.R. 5463 is
not employed here as the model for analysis since its vitality, at the time of this writing, is
not clear; the Senate will almost certainly introduce further changes to the original

proposed rules.

See also text accompanyin note 193, infra.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ct. 233, § 21 (1956). The author, a member of the
Massachusetts Bar, has used illustrative materials from that state, but these remarks will
apply more generally as well. Cf. Leach, supra note 47, at 583 n.117.
141
142

The rules governing impeachment of a criminal defendant by such means are not
here considered, nor is the broad question of the limitations upon extrinsic impeachment
evidence
generally.
4
' See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 106, commentary (1942); UNIFORM RuLES OF
EVIDENCE Rule 21, commentary.

144 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 607, 609, 56 F.R.D. 266, 269-70. The current proposal in
Congress would amend proposed rule 609 in some details not important to this analysis.
H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 42 U.S.L.W. 8.
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District of Massachusetts will have to familiarize himself with the
following variations upon the foregoing state scheme:
(1) Proof of a conviction for impeachment purposes may be
made by evidence of that conviction and not solely by the record
14 5
of it;
the federal best evidence 146 rule probably does not
apply.
(2) There are two provable categories of criminal conviction, but they are slightly different from those obtaining under
state law: felonies, and misdemeanors involving "dishonesty or
' 47
false statement."'
(3) There is no rule against impeaching one's own witness
48
of prior conviction.
proof
by
(4) The federal rule introduces an exception for juvenile
adjudications and another for crimes pardoned or annulled.
Such pardon or annulment must have been based upon a showing of either rehabilitation or of innocence; and if the showing
was of rehabilitation, the witness must not have been convicted
49
of a subsequent crime.1
(5) The period of admissibility of a provable conviction is
50
ten years, with no five-year feature for misdemeanors.
(6) Finally, the ten years begins to run, not from the date of
conviction, but from the time of release from confinement with
respect to any most recent conviction or from the date of the
expiration of a sentence or probationary period for the conviction sought to be proved, whichever is the later.' 5'
Based on the foregoing, a Massachusetts trial lawyer in
either state or federal court may find himself thinking: "Or is it
the other way round?" more often than even the draftsmen of
the proposed rules might have thought desirable. The chances
are high that counsel will have to object to or argue in favor of
evidence of this type before he has time to recall and sort out his
theories. This difficulty is not an insignificant one. Such impeachment is frequently unexpected, the result of the factors
outlined previously 52 as contributing to the continuing possibilities for surprise in criminal, equity and even ordinary civil
145 See Commonvwealth v. Shelipard, 313 Mass. 590, 595-96, 48 N.E.2d 630 635-36,
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 213 (1943); Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 803(22), 56 F.R.D. 303.
46 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 1002, 1003, 1005, 56 F.R.D. 342-43, 345.
7
14 1d. Rule 609(a), 56 F.R.D. 269.
48
' 4 Id.
Rule 607, 56 F.R.D. 266.
9
1 Id. Rule 609(c)-(d), 56 F.R.D. 270.
I" Id. Rule 609(b), 56 F.R.D. 269-70.
15
1 Sd.
152
See text accompanying notes 109-22 supra.
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cases. It is, in part, also the result of factors peculiar to the
problem of prior convictions.
Criminal cases, in particular, in both state and federal
courts, will continually produce the surprise prior conviction of a
supporting witness. It is the extraordinary criminal case in which
an affirmative substantive defense is mounted; investigation of a
defendant's own character witnesses and other supporting witnesses must generally be quite limited. Yet the prosecution often
has the resources, if the witness seems worth impeaching, to
search out and obtain the impeaching information overnight, or
even during a recess. 153
Another example, which may vary in significance with the
geographical location of the court in which the case is being
tried, is furnished by maritime cases. An enormous federal
jurisdiction over ordihary seamen's injuries in admiralty is
shared by the state courts under the so-called "Saving Clause." 154
These cases continually produce the surprise prior conviction of
an uninvestigated supporting witness; the sea apparently provides a job source for convicted men, and it is impracticable in
these fairly routine tort cases to investigate the criminal involvements of one's own supporting witnesses, whose jobs involve
travel to other jurisdictions, sometimes other countries.
For the price paid in convenience and efficiency, is the
proposed federal rule substantially better than a rule which
would require conformity to whatever the state rule happened to
be? It would be difficult to argue that the proposed federal rule
accords with the expressed goal of its draftsmen to simplify the
law of evidence,'

within reach.'

56

55

though that goal does seem to have been

Instead, the draftsmen have supplied a rule

153 Based on the author's experience, the frequency of surprise impeachment is
recognized in the common tactic of keeping certain witnesses away from the courtroom
until they are to testify. Even in well-financed civil litigation, production of a wimess-list,
although frequently sought, is often strenuously opposed. Some lawyers defer even
intramural consideration of the possibility of using someone as a witness in order to avoid
disclosing him to the opponent under questioning by the court at pretrial. Relying on the
corridor interview, or gambling that the contents of the witness' subpoenaed documents
will be favorable, trial counsel does nothing to contact or interview the witness; then, a
day before he should testify, trial counsel will have a sudden inspiration and a subpoena
will be served.
15428 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1970).
155 It is more detailed, for instance, than the illustrative Massachusetts statute, and
much more complex than earlier models furnished by MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule
106 (1942); UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENCE 21. These latter simply provided for impeachment of credibility by proof of convictions for crimenfalsi, remitting such difficulties as
remoteness in time (essentially a problem of relevancy) to the discretion of the court.
156 The draftsmen could, for example, have left reception of this sort of evidence to
the discretion of the court. Cf Luck v. United Statles, 348 F.2d 763, 767-68 (D.C. Cir.
1965); CALIF. EvID. CODE § 788 (West 1966). However, because Congress had seemingly
rejected the doctrine of Luck for the District of Columbia in the Court Reform Act of
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complex in its own detail and additionally complex in its employment when it competes for an attorney's recollection with a
similarly detailed state rule. As to reform, although the proposed
federal rule employs the notion that the crime used for impeachment should have to do with falsehood, it obscures the
' 57
point by using the Uniform Rule language about "dishonesty,"'
and it blunts the edge of reform in any event by limiting the
distinction to misdemeanors, a step backward from the position
taken by both the Model Code and the Uniform Rules. 58 As for
the variations in time periods and in dates of their onset, these
are, of course, arbitrary. 159 Weighing these considerations, it is
difficult to see why the particular rule proposed would be
superior to one requiring conformity to the forum state rule on
this issue.
B. Hearsay
The impeachment example concerns a set of arbitrary limitations upon admissibility of one very narrow class of evidence.
The same sorts of difficulties are associated with federal rules of
more pervasive application and presumably less arbitrary content
as well, if they are drafted in a detailed way and tend to differ
along unpredictable lines from parallel state provisions. In addition, there may occur further difficulties for the bar in mastering
the interworkings of complex rules as they mesh with each other
in ways that also may deviate unpredictably from existing state
law. This is precisely the situation raised by the proposed federal
160
hearsay rules.
With hearsay, as with impeachment, one cannot help striking a regretful note for lost opportunities. The admissibility of
hearsay has been understood for generations to depend, at
bottom, upon a few broad qualitative factors: the need for the
proof (its probative value); the difficulty of getting it from
1970, D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1973), see Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89, 91 (D.C.
App. 1972), the draftsmen felt bound to avoid this alternative. See Hearings,supra note 1,
at 68 (testimony of Judge Albert B. Mars).
The alternative of excluding this sort of impeaching evidence entirely has also been
widely recommended. See Blakney v. United States, 397 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(McGowan, J., concurring); Ashcraft, Evidence of Former Convictions, 41 CH. B. REc. 303,
307 (1960); Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 176-78 (1940);
Spector, Impeaching the Defendant by His PriorConvictions and the Proposed FederalRules of
Evidence,
1 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.I. 247 (1970).
57

1 See UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 21.
'58 Compare Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 609(c), 56 F.R.D. 269, with MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE Rule 106 (1942); UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 21.
159
160 See Spector, supra note 156, at 256.

See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII, 56 F.R.D. 293-331. H.R. 5463 would change

the hearsay rules in ways not important to this analysis.
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another source; the intrinsic reliability of the hearsay source
under the circumstances.' 6 ' This is the stuff of which a comprehensive rule of court might be fashioned. A simplified federal
hearsay rule might have directed court and counsel toward the
fundamental policy concerns we have noted (need, reliability,
62
unavailability).
Instead, the draftsmen opted' 63 to string out the hearsay
rule among three categories of detailed exclusions and exceptions. Some hearsay is excluded from the operation of the rule
by way of definition, including nonassertive conduct 164 and prior
statements by witnesses, 6 5 and by such familiar exclusions as
statements offered other than for their truth,' 6 6 and admissions
by a party opponent 67 (although this last is more typically
conceived as an exception rather than an exclusion). There
follow two broad categories of exceptions, under one of which
the hearsay declarant must be unavailable 6 8 and under the
other of which his availability is immaterial. 69 The theoretical
basis of the distinction between the two classes of exceptions is
said to be their degree of reliability, 170 but it may not be clear to
some practitioners why former testimony, statements under belief of impending death and statements against interest,' 7' for
example, are less reliable than present sense impressions, excited
utterances and recorded recollections. 72 The problem of mastering the distinction between rules 803 and 804 aside, the itdividual exceptions thereunder contain further limitations and
qualifications, some of which appear quite optimistic about the
capacity of trial lawyers. Rule 803, for example, allows as an
exception:
[a] statement of the declarant's then existing state of
mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and
'
See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 626 (1954): "It
now seems strange that the courts should have attempted to answer this by defining in
sharp categories the special situations when secondary proof would be required"; J.

WIGMORE,
STUDENT MANDBOOK
162

OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

See notes 90-95 supra & accompanying text.

247 (1935).

163 See authorities cited note 94 supra.

164See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 801(a)(2), 56 F.R.D. 293. For a critique, see note 92
56 F.R.D. 293.

supra.
165 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1),
166
Id. Rule 801(c), 56 F.R.D. 293.
167 1d. Rule 801(d)(2), 56 F.R.D. 293.
168
Id.Rule 804, 56 F.R.D. 320.
169
Id. Rule 803, 56 F.R.D. 300.
17

1 See id. Rule 803, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 303.
id. Rules 804(b)(1), (3)-(4), 56 F.R.D. 321.
1See id. Rules 803(1), (2), (5), 56 F.R.D. 300.

171 See
17
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bodily health), but not including a statement of memory
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed
unless it relates to the execution, 1 73revocation,
identification, or terms of declarant's will.
The scheme here outlined, is, like the rest of the proposed
rules, not particularly simple. The parallel provisions of state law
are likely to be almost as complek. 1 74 The problem of having to
choose among vaguely recollected provisions of these parallel
systems under stress of trial is inevitable. Concededly the major
hearsay questions in most litigation may be researched in advance: the, admissibility of the surveyor's report, the doctor's
notes, the out-of-court identification. But it is probably impossible to avoid continual reception of what is technically hearsay in
any evidentiary hearing; and in any event, as we have seen,
injunction proceedings and criminal cases will produce major
items of unanticipated hearsay.
In whatever court a trial lawyer finds himself, then, he will
be confronted by the same problems noted in our earlier discussion about impeachment: deciding what general exception applies to the case and which of two varying versions to argue. 7 5 A
further difficulty lies in coordinating any one group of rules with
the other rules and then keeping clear the distinctions between
the interaction among the rules under state law and the interaction under federal law. For example, a document may be selfauthenticating but nevertheless inadmissible as hearsay in one set
of courts; yet in the other set of courts it may turn out not to be
hearsay but inadmissible if an authenticating foundation has not
been laid; and to both sets of requirements must be added the
conflicting systems' positions with respect to best evidence and
the related requirement of "originals." 17 6 Given the pervasiveness of the hearsay issue, the complexity of state hearsay rules,
and the failure of the proposed federal rules to effect substantial
reform, we may reasonably conclude that introduction of the
new federal rules will create problems in determination and
"13Id.Rule 803(3), 56 F.R.D. 300 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., id. Rules 803(5), (7),
804(b)(2), (4), 56 F.R.D. 300-01, 321.
174The accretions of state hearsay rules have themselves for generations been under
fire as being haphazard, accidental, unrefined, and illogical. See generally authorities cited
note 95 supra.
175 For a survey of significant variations between the proposed federal hearsay rules
and the weight of state authority, see Falknor, Hearsay, 1969 LAw & Soc. ORDER 591.
Note also the learned summary of Mr. George Spiegelberg, American College of Trial
Lawyers, Hearings, sura note 1, Supp. 68.
176See generally Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)-(17), 804(a)-(b)(1), 901(b)(7), 902,
1001-07, 56F.R.D. 300-02, 320-21, 331-32, 336-37, 340-46.
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application of evidentiary law which would clearly outweigh any
federal interest in the specific provisions of the proposed hearsay
rules, or the federal interest in having specific hearsay rules
made distinctly federal.
This Section has briefly focused upon a particular rule
governing impeachment, and, in cruder outline, upon a broad,
complex set of rules governing exceptions to the hearsay rule.
But it would seem that similar analysis would produce similar
conclusions in many of the remaining areas of evidentiary law.
Rules controlling character evidence and evidence of characteristic or related behaviors, 17 7 identification and authentication of
nondocumentary evidence, 17 8 and even such matters as the taking of judicial notice 179 may become the subject of unanticipated
controversy. The Advisory Committee Notes reveal the variety of
state law on these questions and the selective quality of the
proposed federal rules.
VI.

TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE
FOR THE RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE

IN ALL FEDERAL COURTS

The foregoing sections have argued that the adoption of a
code of comprehensive new federal evidentiary rules must result
in grave inconveniences in trials in both state and federal courts,
and that this consideration weighs heavily against their adoption.
But the functional problems considered above do not indicate
that all current evidentiary problems in the federal courts would
be better handled by doing nothing. Indeed, the proposed rules
would at least accomplish the unification of evidentiary rules
under all headings of federal jurisdiction.
The genuine need for unification of evidentiary rules has
already been pointed out.'8 0 But the problem ought to be
amenable to solution by means less disruptive than the promulgation of a comprehensive federal evidence code. A statutory
federal choice-of-law provision mandating reference to state
evidentiary law in all federal cases would probably be the simplest way of achieving that unification while improving, rather
than causing further deterioration in, the desired conformity of
177E.g., id. Rules 404-06, 608, 56 F.R.D. 219-23, 267.
8
"1 E.g., id. Rules 901, 902, 56 F.R.D. 331-32, 336-37.

17 9 Id. Rule 201, 56 F.R.D. 201. See generally Davis, supra note 71 (extremely critical of
the inconvenience of proposed rule 201).
18°See text accompanying notes 58-61 supra.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:594

evidence rules in federal courts to those of the courts of the state
in which they sit.
Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure furnishes
some precedent for the use of a federal choice-of-law rule for
evidence. The rule admits all evidence
which is admissible under the statutes of the United
States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on the hearing
of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied
in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which
the United States Court is held.
Stated simply, the rule provides that both federal and state
evidentiary law will apply in all civil cases, the choice to be made
according to whichever rule favors the reception of the evidence.
Although the provision came early under serious scholarly
criticism,' 8 ' it has become increasingly clear that rule 43(a) is
"working better than these commentators had expected.' 118 2
However, rule 43(a) does not apply in criminal cases, 183 and
although it theoretically applies in bankruptcy and in
admiralty, 8 4 it has nevet been clear how far outside the diversity
jurisdiction the rule retains vitality. It has been shown that in
cases where the United States is a party, little use is made of state
evidentiary decisions, and that reference to state law of evidence
is uncommon in federal question cases and infrequent in admiralty and bankruptcy. 185 Thus, unification of the evidentiary rules
in federal courts has not been accomplished. 1 86 Furthermore,
rule 43(a) has fostered considerable confusion about the extent
to which the federal courts are free to fashion their own common law of evidence under the clause referring to "the rules of
evidence heretofore applied in . . . suits in equity."' 87 Finally,
rule 43(a) does little to discourage the further elaboration of two
separate bodies of evidentiary law in each state.'8 8 None of these
8' 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 200-04 (3d ed. 1940); Green, The Admissibility of Evidence
Under the Federal Rules, 55 HARV. L. REv. 197 (1941).
1821962 Preliminary Report, supra note 10, at 89-90; J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
43.01 [7] (2d ed. 1971). It should be noted that under the proposed rules the pattern

favoring admissibility will be lost.
'83 ederal common law of evidence applies in criminal cases, according to FED. R.
GRIM. 4 P. 26.
' See note 61 supra.
185 See Weinstein, supra note 10, at 377-78 (Sherman Appendix).

See 1962 Preliminary Report, supra note 10, at 98, 115.
See, e.g., id. 98, 115; Degnan, supra note 12, at 276; Green, FederalCivil Procedure
Rule 43(a), 5 VAND. L. REv. 560 (1952); Comment, Federal Rule 43(a): The Scope of
Admissibility of Evidence and the Implications of the Erie Doctrine, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1049
(1962); Comment, Rule 43(a) and Erie-The Conflict in the Sixth Circuit, 34 TENN. G. REv.
187

671 (1967).
tt8 As to the significance of this problem, see notes 132-36 supra & accompanying
text.
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problems would arise if instead of rule 43(a) we had a clear
choice-of-law provision generally opting for state law, even in
criminal, admiralty, bankruptcy and federal question cases.
Objection might be made that state law cannot deal with
certain evidentiary problems which may be unique to substantively federal cases. Of course this objection can be of
significance only, if at all, in those relatively few areas in which
federal courts retain exclusive jurisdiction. On the whole, the
power of common law judges to find analogies would seem to
undercut this objection to the extent that the problem is real.
Particular objection might be made to the use of state
evidentiary rules in federal criminal prosecutions, where federal
substantive policies are of overriding concern. It should be
pointed out that much of the force of this objection may be
removed by appropriate exceptions, discussed in the following
paragraph. But it would seem that the objection lacks force
initially in view of the fact that deference to state law to supply
even substantive content to federal criminal law' 89 has been an
appropriate and workable result where other strong national
policies require it.' 9°
Objection may also be made that such a choice-of-law rule
would inevitably be subject to too many exceptions to work. Yet,
upon reflection, the kinds of exceptions likely to arise are also
exceptions to the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. The most
important example is the exception for evidentiary questions of
constitutional dignity.' 9 1 This exception would be at least as
workable under the suggested choice-of-law rule as under the
proposed rules, because state law is also, for the most part,
subject to federal constitutional requirements. The suggestion
has been made' 9 2 that at the very least state privileges should not
be applied in federal prosecutions. The point is well taken,
because the national policies at stake will outweigh the local
interests embodied in the privileges, while functional problems
of the sort discussed above would be less likely to arise.' 9 3 Other
exceptions, of broader application than the two exceptions
noted, may be necessary wherever federal evidentiary rules of
great vitality embody matters of overriding national policy, such
"89

See, e.g., Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).

1 0 Cf. teit iccompanying notes 29-32 supra.
1

" A list of other exceptions is given in proposed rules 1101(d)-(e), 56 F.R.D. 347-48.
This exception was suggested by Judge Henry Friendly in commenting on this
Article. See also Hearings, supra note 1, at 220.
192

193 As noted in Section V supra, the more "substantive" the rule, the more likely it is
to have been fully considered in advance of trial.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:594

as the traditional power of a federal judge to comment to the
jury on the evidence. 19 4 Yet the kinds of exceptions necessary are
probably capable, like those currently endured, 1 95 of sufficiently
19 6
clear enumeration to avoid important difficulty.
The kinds of functional problems pointed out in the preceding sections do not necessarily arise in connection with evidentiary "housekeeping" rules which may be more in the nature of
simply procedural rules, such as rules prescribing order of
witnesses, scope of interrogation and offers of proof upon an
exclusionary ruling. Nevertheless, since such matters do not
seem to involve important national policies, for simplicity's sake
it should be urged that any federal choice-of-law evidentiary rule
be broad enough to take these matters in; indeed, to take in
whatever has been covered in the proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, subject to those few exceptions already noted involving
important federal policies.
It is not necessary to argue at great length that Congress has
power to adopt such a choice-of-evidentiary-law rule for federal
courts. That power must be subsumed under its power to
promulgate actual evidentiary rules for the federal courts.
Moreover, the question whether there is national power would
have none of the impact it has had with respect to the proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, under Erie, since what is being
mandated is reference to state law. Finally, abundant precedent
exists on the point that federal choice-of-law rules may be
9
created for federal courts.1
VII.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing analyses indicate that the existence of national power cannot alone justify its implementation. It has been
194

See authorities cited note 64 supra.
195 The current federal statutes regulating the admission of particular kinds of
evidence are few in number. See generally 2B W. BARRON & A. HOGTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 967 (Wright ed. 1958); J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
44.01[4] to -.05 (2d ed. 1971). The most significant of these is the Federal Business
Records Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970). Conforming amendments to these measures were
submitted to Congress by the Supreme Court along with the proposed rules. Under the
suggested choice-of-law rule, these measures could-be retained or repealed.
96
'
See Leach, supra note 47, at 584-85.
197For example, FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a), as well as numerous other rules of civil
procedure taking similar positions, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e), 17(b), 62(f), 64, 69(a).
Additionally, Erie and its progeny are familiar examples of vertical choice-of-law rules on
both substantive and procedural questions, for thie guidance of federal courts. The
horizontal choice of the law of a particular state-in the suggested evidentiary legislation
to be fixed as that of the forum state-has also been addressed by the Supreme Court on
occasion, see, e.g, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), and the
Court has in this way reviewed congressional legislative horizontal choices. Compare
Richards v. Uhited States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962), with Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2674 (1970). See also Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970).
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a fundamental conceptual error to limit the vertical choice-of-law
question to Erie and its progeny. Our federal system rests on
other strong "cornerstones" as well, including the important
principle that new federal law is not created in the absence of
demonstrable national need. By including in our analysis the
questions whether such national need exists, and, if so, whether
it can be satisfied without disturbance to settled local arrangements, we are able to reach functional questions about the
advantages and disadvantages of proposed new federal law,
which we could not reach through traditional Erie analysis alone.
The national interest in modernization of federal evidentiary practice and in improvement of procedure in all courts is a
real one. But scrutiny of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, in the light of functional considerations rather than with
respect to their scholarly merit, indicates that no such modernization or simplification of evidentiary law has been achieved
sufficient to meet the described need. Indeed, scrutiny of the
proposed rules indicates that the existence of these detailed rules
side by side with perhaps equally complex state rules may create
undue difficulties of assimilation and application in both state
and federal courts. Rather paradoxically, in light of our understandings under Erie, it may further be concluded that in inherently arbitrary areas, in which any of a number of possible rules
might be a fair one, promulgation of new federal law would be
particularly undesirable. That is, in this prudential area beyond
the scope of Erie, the less "substantive" the content of a rule, the
more it may appear that the introduction of new federal law
paralleling preexisting state law would be an inappropriate exercise of the national lawmaking power.
The genuine need for unification of evidentiary rules over
all headings of federal jurisdiction might therefore better be
served by legislation requiring reference to forum state evidentiary law for all federal jurisdictional headings, subject to limited
classes of exceptions. Such a solution may in time give way to a
truly simplified scheme of evidentiary law for federal courts
sufficient to serve as a model for reform of state evidentiary law.
For historic and institutional reasons, the questions this
Article has raised are now exclusively for Congress. It is urged
that Congress should, based upon these considerations as well as
those upon which it has already' acted, disapprove the
promulgation of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.1 98 It is
199
The writer was gratified to read the testimony ofJudge Henry Friendly, Hearings,
supra note 1, at 246-61, reaching substantially similar conclusions.
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further suggested that Congress proceed to study the ad' isability
of legislation unifying the reception of evidence under all headings of federal jurisdiction by mandating federal court reference
to forum state evidentiary law.

